This paper puts forward a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the exogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the idea that the policy uncertainty that is associated with periodic competitive elections should be expected to induce delay of migration, thus generating an electoral migration cycle of relatively low rates of migration before the elections, followed by relatively high rates of migration when electoral uncertainty is resolved. Conversely, interjurisdictional migration ‡ows that are unrelated to local public service provision motives ought to be orthogonal to the timing of local elections. Empirically, I study sorting patterns across several thousands of peninsular Italy's municipalities through the increasingly turbulent 2002-2013 decade. I …nd evidence of an electoral migration cycle in the sense that the timing of internal migration ‡ows is systematically in ‡uenced by the schedule of recurrent mayoral elections.
Introduction
The idea of mobile households sorting across localities according to their preferences for local public services, or "voting with their feet" (Tiebout, 1956 ), has played an important role in theoretical public economics as well as in the actual design of decentralized government structures during the past decades (Gill and Rodriguez-Pose, 2012). 1 However, testing the impact of local public good provision on households' location decisions empirically has proved di¢ cult, with traditional econometric approaches following in either of the following two categories. The …rst is a direct testing approach attempting at modelling the actual ‡ows of migration as a function of local provision of public goods and services -an approach that is well know to su¤er from the endogeneity of local choices (Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008) . The second is an indirect approach verifying some key implications of the Tiebout theory in terms of capitalization of local public policies (taxes and expenditures) into house prices and strati…cation of households by income or wealth, with those implications turning out over time to be less straightforward than was once thought (Oates, 2006) . The most recent approaches are based on structural estimation of parametric general equilibrium models that study the sorting decisions of populations of heterogeneous agents, where the attributes of the available choice alternatives are determined endogenously as an indirect outcome of the very sorting process (Epple et al., 2001 ; Kumino¤ et al., 2013 ).
This paper puts forward a novel and powerful test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the exogenous time schedule of recurrent elections that is typical of most local government arrangements in the democracies of the Western world.
The idea that the calendar of elections can have an in ‡uence on the trajectory of a number of key aggregate economic variables and on the making of public 1 The strati…cation of localities as a result of sorting has spurred a heated debate too (Bishop and Cushing, 2008) . policy has a long tradition in economics. 2 Nordhaus (1975) was the …rst to formally and in ‡uentially argue that the fact that "the government be chosen in periodic competitive elections" (Nordhaus, 1975: 185) can induce incumbent politicians to exploit short-term macroeconomic trade-o¤s and produce political business cycles of low pre-election unemployment rates followed by after-election in ‡ationary pressures. Later, Rogo¤ (1990) Indeed, the existence of a register of periodic competitive elections where candidates with di¤erent views of the world run for o¢ ce implies that …scal policy and public good provision are subject to hard to predict discrete changes over time, with those changes tending to occur in synchrony with the …xed electoral calendar. Moreover, government breaks and subsequent policy reversals in a local government structure might have consequences that seem to have been overlooked so far. In a world of mobile households that are willing to exit to consume their preferred bundles of public services elsewhere, the …xed time structure of local elections seems likely to a¤ect the timing of interjurisdictional migration too. In particular, if we interpret the migration decision as an irreversible investment, the predetermined election schedule might give rise to a sorting cycle, with residents that are willing to shop elsewhere for the public services they require (e.g., schooling for their children, or care homes for their elderly relatives) delaying their exit decision to after an uncertain election. Plausibly, the re ‡ection of the calendar of local elections into the timing of interjurisdictional migration ‡ows will tend to be ampli…ed by the policy radicalization that is usually observed in times of economic crises, with incumbents' defeats being followed by signi…cant local policy changes. Conversely, interjurisdictional migration ‡ows that are unrelated to local public service provision motives ought to be orthogonal to the timing and the outcomes of local elections.
The main objective of this paper is to test whether the schedule of local elections -an exogenous institutional feature in most environments, including the one we analyze empirically here -has an in ‡uence on the timing of migration decisions. I thus allow the …xed revenue-expenditure pattern that is typical of a strict 'city manager'interpretation of the Tiebout model (Oates, 2006) to be subject to periodic perturbations at exogenous election dates, and verify empirically if the pattern of households' sorting across the available locations is a¤ected by the time structure of municipal elections. The coexistence, using
Hirschman's (1970) celebrated terminology, of a voice option that is dictated by an arguably exogenous schedule of periodic mayoral elections and of a roughly continuous exit option that is available in every year of the term of o¢ ce creates the conditions for an 'electoral migration cycle,'where the timing of local elections tends to have an impact on the timing of moving decisions.
I formalize the electoral migration cycle idea within a simple model whose basic insight can be traced back to the models of irreversible investment in the presence of uncertainty of Cukierman (1980) , Bernanke (1983) and Rodrik (1991), and whose structure is similar to Canes-Wrone and Park (2012). In the multi-jurisdictional structure of the model, migration is a costly irreversible choice, and its return depends on the outcome of an uncertain election. The degree of electoral uncertainty constitutes a potentially important determinant of the likelihood of unsatis…ed households to move in order to consume their desired mix of public services: the more uncertain is the election, the higher is the gain for residents to wait until after the election before making their migration decision, when such high uncertainty will be resolved, thus reducing migration before the elections. Conversely, low electoral uncertainty makes early exit the only credible way of increasing one's welfare. As a result, the probability of migrating out of a locality tends to be higher in the aftermath than on the eve of a close election, that is after the electoral uncertainty concerning the type of public good that will be provided has been resolved. In empirical terms, the 
Migrating under uncertainty
I succinctly formalize the mechanism giving rise to an electoral migration cycle in a local government structure by means of a simple model whose basic insight can be traced back to the irreversible investment models of Cukierman (1980), Bernanke (1983) and Rodrik (1991) , and whose structure is roughly similar to
Canes-Wrone and Park (2012). In those models, increased uncertainty on the returns to an investment (due, for instance, to uncertainty on future …scal, trade, and exchange-rate policies) causes a decrease in the current level of investment even by risk-neutral investors by making it more pro…table to wait longer and gather more information on the distribution of the relevant parameters. In particular, the incentive to delay an investment depends inversely on the precision with which the uncertain outcome can be predicted and on the cost of delay (in terms of foregone pro…ts), and it depends directly on the degree to which the optimal features of the investment (e.g., the size or location of a plant) are a¤ected by the realization of the stochastic event.
Here, I consider the irreversible investment that is represented by households' migration decisions in the presence of uncertainty on local election outcomes.
I analyze a decentralized structure of government, where each jurisdiction n = 1; :::; N is inhabited by overlapping generations of agents that are born of either of two types -= fl; rg -in terms of their preferences for local public goods.
Denoting by u (x n ) the utility function of a voter of type , and by x n = fl; rg the public good type that is supplied in the jurisdiction where the voter resides, I assume that: u (x n ) = u if x n = , and u (x n ) = u if x n 6 = , with u u u > 0. 3 In each locality, expenditure on the public good is entirely funded by lump-sum federal grants, 4 and the public good to be provided, l or r, is selected by majority voting. 5 Recurrent elections are simultaneously held at the end of every period in all localities. 6 A voter of type always votes for -type public goods, and newly born individuals acquire the right to vote on local public good provision either in the locality they were born in or in the locality they decide to migrate to.
Any resident experiencing x n 6 = can either stay in the locality where he is born and content with low utility u, or migrate to a locality where x n = by incurring a moving cost c. Moving amounts to an irreversible investment (e.g., due to changing house and job) that can either be made immediately, or be delayed at the cost of renouncing to consume the desired public good in the current period. There exists at least one locality j providing the public good x j = for any voter-type , and the cost of moving is unrelated to the geographic distance between two jurisdictions. Agents do not take into account the e¤ects of their own movements on future local policies.
When a voter is born, nature selects (voter's type) and c (cost of moving).
Of course, no voter moves for whom x n = in his own jurisdiction of residence if the cost of moving is positive. On the other hand, consider the moving calculus of an individual whose preferences do not match the majority of his community's preferences (x n 6 = ), and assume …rst that no uncertainty exists about the outcome of elections, meaning that public good x n will be provided with certainty in the next period too. If an individual moves immediately to a locality providing the desired public good , utility is u c in the current period, and u in the next period, with < 1 a time discount factor. If he delays exit to after the election, he has low utility u in the current period, and (u c) in the future period. As shown in equation (1) below, it is preferable to delay migration if the cost of delay -that is, the gain in utility u that he would get by migrating immediately -is smaller than the gain of delay, that in this simple, no uncertainty case is represented by the di¤erence in the cost of migration between moving today (c) and moving in the next period ( c):
Consider now the case of an uncertain election, and let denote the probability that the election provokes a policy reversal. 7 If the individual migrates immediately to a locality providing x j = , he has utility u c in the current period, and will have utility [(1 ) u + u] in the future period, after the election: utility in the next period is high if no policy change occurs, and is low in case of a policy change occurring with probability . If the individual delays exit to after the election, he has low utility u in the current period, and will have utility [ u + (1 ) (u c)] in the future period, where the …rst term ( u) picks the high utility level that the voter obtains without migrating in case of a policy change in the own jurisdiction that occurs with probability ; the second term (1 ) (u c) captures the utility level that can instead be obtained by exercising the costly exit option after the election if no policy change occurred in the own jurisdiction. As a result, the individual delays migration 7 I assume for the moment that the probability of a policy change is the same in all localities, including the own jurisdiction of residence, though it is possible to generalize the analysis to heterogeneous degrees of electoral uncertainty across localities with no substantial consequences. Moreover, could alternatively be interpreted as the probability that a restrictive …scal policy (a …scal consolidation) be opportunistically implemented after the election that reduces residents' utility to u. The fundamental conclusions of the model would be the same under this alternative interpretation of electoral uncertainty.
if the cost of delay is smaller than a threshold cost level that accounts for the uncertain election result:
Equation (2) shows that delaying migration to after the election is more likely if the cost of migration (c) is high, if the cost of delaying ( u = u u) is low, and if the probability of a change of government ( ) is high.
Institutional framework and dataset
The empirical analysis relies on a panel dataset of variables that are measured at the lowest (municipal) of the three tiers of the Italian local government structure. 8 The municipal level of government is in fact the oldest administrative jurisdiction in Italy, and municipal authorities -whose role as an autonomous and representative level of government is explicitly de…ned in the Constitution -are statutorily responsible, irrespective of their size, for the provision of a number of crucial public services in two main areas. 9 The …rst area con- (table 1) . Overall, the dataset has over 80,000 observations. All demographic variables are available from the Italian national statistics institute (ISTAT). Table 2 Table 1 shows that foreign outmigration has been rising considerably over the decade too, a phenomenon that is mostly due to young unemployed searching for jobs abroad. The size of foreign migration appears negligible, though, relative to internal migration ‡ows, and I disregard it in the rest of the analysis.
The empirical speci…cation (3) below has the rate of outmigration from locality n to any other Italian locality in year t (m nt ) as the dependent variable ( ‡ow of people that are cancelled from the local list of residents because of moving to other Italian municipalities from January 1st to December 31st, expressed as a percentage of resident population on January 1st of each year), and controls for the macroeconomic trends mentioned above by including year e¤ects (y t ):
The staggered electoral schedule, with a considerable number of municipalities having elections in each year, allows me to identify the e¤ect of the timing of voting (parameter l in (3)) separately from common year e¤ects. In par-ticular, to test the impact of election timing on sorting, I build a vector of L dummy variables e(t l) that equal 1 if there was an election in the l = 1; :::; L calendar years preceding the migration measurement year t in municipality n.
I start from L = 1 and keep on adding further lagged election year dummies for up to an election having taken place four years back (L = 4). In the latter case, and given that the conventional term of o¢ ce lasts …ve years, the fourth year after an election is in fact the eve of the next election and, according to the electoral migration model, should record low rates of outmigration. Finally, I build a composite 'after-election'dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation on internal migration refers to either of the two years following a municipal election. In order to consistently estimate (3) and control for locality-speci…c 
Electoral uncertainty
As sketched in section 2, the mechanism that is hypothesized to drive the delay of migration to after the elections is the uncertainty that is associated with competitive mayoral races. The closer an election outcome is expected to be, the stronger is the incentive to wait and learn the outcome of the election, thus delaying the decision to migrate. In order to explicitly test that hypothesis, I
would need an as accurate as possible proxy of closeness of an election outcome Consequently, in order to better capture the ex ante closeness of an election, I employ a dummy variable that equals 1 in elections that are uncontested.
Such variable has some limitations too. It is of course an accurate description 1 0 De Paola and Scoppa (2014) focus on dual ballot elections for larger (>15,000 inhabitants) municipalities, and use …rst round vote closeness as an instrument for second round closeness in a voter turnout equation. I cannot use that strategy here because the large majority of my observations refer to smaller municipalities that follow a single ballot electoral system. of lack of competition in those local elections where a candidate runs unopposed, and has the advantage of revealing the degree of uncertainty on the outcome of an election before the election itself. On the other hand, its main weakness is due to the fact that it might understimate the true number of non-competitive outcomes by missing those races whose result is easily predictable even in the presence of more than one candidate. In our sample, uncontested elections are about 6% of total elections. In fact, the two electoral uncertainty indicators are related in the sense that as the win margin increases and approaches 100% of the votes of the elected mayor, the (ex post) win margin converges to the (ex ante) uncontested election indicator.
As for timing, given that the term of o¢ ce lasts …ve years and that the incumbent can only a¤ect the date of the next election by strategically resigning (an event that seems extremely unlikely to occur in the environment we study here), the date of the next election can in most circumstances be assumed to be common information throughout the length of term. On the other hand, the degree of competition at an election becomes known to voters only in the immediacy of an election (usually no later than a month before the date of the election) with the formal registration and announcement of candidates. As a result, and as long as election uncertainty plays a role in households' moving decisions, "low uncertainty" elections should neither in ‡uence migration decisions in the years preceding an election (based on the presumption that voters do not even know at that time whether the election will be contested or not) nor should induce delay to after the election in order to learn its outcome. Rather, since the news of "low uncertainty" election should have an immediate impact on potetial movers, we would expect the rate of outmigration to be higher in uncontested districts in the year elections are held. Table 6 reports the estimation results of a migration equation that allows for an e¤ect from the two electoral uncertainty variables discussed above. I include dummies for the year after the election, for the year in which elections are held, and for the year before the election respectively. As for the win margin dummy, I build a low uncertainty (large win) dummy variable equaling 1 if the ex post win margin exceeds the median sample value of 30% of the votes of the elected mayor, and expect low uncertainty to raise (lower) outmigration immediately before (after) the election relative to what would happen in the proximity of an uncertain election, that is to ‡atten or cancel altogether any evidence of an electoral migration cycle. I tried with a number of thresholds and report here the results based on the median 30% win margin threshold. As argued above, the results converge to the uncontested election dummy speci…cation as the win margin threshold is moved closer to 100%. Relatedly, I expect the uncontested election dummy to in ‡ate the outmigration rate in the year when information on the candidates running at a municipal election is spread, that is in the proximity of the election year. With the win margin set at the median threshold of 30% of the incumbent's votes, the estimation results show in this case -columns (6.2) and (6.3) -that the low competition dummy has no signi…cant impact on exit/outmigration on top of the e¤ects generated by the pure election timing (slowdown of outmigration before the elections, followed by a rise in outmigration after the elections). On the other hand, when employing a dummy variable for an uncontested election (that is equivalent to raising the win margin threshold for building the low competition dummy to 100%), I …nd a signi…cant positive impact of such variable on migration in the election year. This is compatible with the idea of an immediate e¤ect on migration decisions as soon as news on whether elections are contested or not are spread, and suggests that lack of competition at an election lowers the incentive to wait and delay migration to after the election. The result is robust to the introduction of the demographic composition of the resident population among the potential determinants of internal migration, with younger cohorts being found to be signi…cantly and expectedly more likely to exit than older ones.
Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a novel test of local public good-induced sorting that relies on the time structure of periodic local elections as an exogenous source of policy uncertainty. The idea is that the policy uncertainty that is induced by competitive local elections generates an electoral migration cycle in terms of relatively low rates of migration before the elections, followed by relatively high rates of migration when the electoral uncertainty is resolved. On the other hand, Notes: dependent variable = % out-migration. North trend is a linear trend interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities located in Northern Italy. 6,702 municipalities. Standard errors in parentheses.
Tables
: p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10. Notes: dependent variable = % out-migration. 6,702 municipalities. Standard errors in parentheses.
: p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10. 
